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INTRODUCTION
Pro se litigation is a daunting task for anyone, let alone an
uneducated or indigent party who cannot afford representation. As of
2015, a criminal defendant has the right to counsel, but a civil party
has no similar right.1 In a survey of federal cases in 2009, the U.S.
Courts of Appeals heard 27,905 cases of pro se litigants—“a surprising
48%” of the total number of cases heard in the courts that year.2 It is
also possible that uneducated or indigent appellants are represented by
ineffective or incompetent counsel. This leads to the question: how
does the court system reconcile a large number of cases being
ineffectively handled (through no fault of the party) with the notions
of justice?

 J.D. candidate, May 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2
Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality: Reconsidering
the Liberal Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV. 863, 871 (2011).
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Technology may provide an answer. Since the proliferation of the
home computer and Internet access, laypeople can access a vast
amount of specialized information from their home. Similarly,
“[t]echnology in litigation has changed enormously since the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.”3 The stereotype of Internet
research is that it is completely unreliable, but much information
available on the Internet is credible and can be a great resource in the
right hands.4 The urge for trial courts, juries, and even appellate courts
to simply “google”5 an aspect of the case is very tempting. Developing
standards for a court’s use of this type of Internet search is critical in
both limiting a court’s desire to impermissibly search outside of the
record as well as providing a stepping-stone to assist pro se or indigent
litigants who are getting lost in the system due to insufficient
pleadings and evidence.
In the recent Seventh Circuit decision Rowe v. Gibson, Judge
Posner relied on Internet research to reverse a district court’s finding
of summary judgment against a pro se prisoner litigant.6 This article
will discuss the controversial choices that Judge Posner made and will
develop a framework to allow courts to adopt Internet research in the
courtroom. By supplementing current judicial practices regarding pro
se litigants with careful Internet research, courts may ensure that pro
se litigants have the greatest access to justice.
Part I of this article examines the history of the record, case law
surrounding the notion that an appellate court must not look outside of
the record in making its determination, as well as the increasing use of
technology in the courtroom. This section provides a backdrop to
3

Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 136,
142 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
4
See Internet Accuracy: Is Information on the Web Reliable? 18 CQ
RESEARCHER 625, 630 (2008) (noting that Internet sources do not lie more than
people “in real life” and Internet sources are not necessarily more biased than other
information sources).
5
Google (v): to “enter (a search term) into the Google search engine to find
information on the Internet; to search for information about (a person or thing) in
this way.” Google, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006).
6
Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F. 3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015).
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Rowe v. Gibson and potential further uses of technology in the
courtroom. Part II examines the recent Seventh Circuit decision Rowe
v. Gibson and analyzes Judge Posner’s majority opinion, Judge
Rovner’s concurrence, and Judge Hamilton’s dissent. Part III develops
a test using current appellate practices regarding pro se litigants in
order to adopt Internet research into these current practices. Part IV
applies this test to the methodology of Rowe v. Gibson and evaluates
Judge Posner’s use of Internet research in this case. That part
concludes that while Judge Posner was correct in using Internet
research in this situation, the kinds of websites he consulted varied too
greatly. For Internet research to be a viable tool in a courtroom, the
research must meet minimum standards of accuracy and reliability.
BACKGROUND & HISTORY OF THE RECORD, JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
It is generally accepted that a court cannot expand the record on
appeal with materials that were not presented to the trial court.
“Appellate courts have two primary institutional objectives: to develop
the law in a particular area as guidance for future cases and to rectify
egregious errors in discrete cases.”7 In order to best effectuate this
goal, the appellate court must examine the entire record of the trial
court to determine for itself if (after determining the correct standard
of review) the trial court decision should stand.8
A reviewing court cannot correct a potential error “if the basis for
the appellant’s assertion of error is not before the court.”9 Therefore, a
complete record is necessary, and typically an appellate court must not
consult matters outside of the record.10

7

Christopher M. Pietruszkiewicz, Economic Substance and the Standard of
Review, 60 ALA. L. REV. 339, 341 (2009).
8
Id. at 351.
9
Id.
10
Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the DecisionMaking Process, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 160 (2004–2005).
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The record first began to be used in the Court of England during
Henry II’s reign.11 It was little more than pleadings and documentary
evidence submitted at trial, and errors were commonplace.12 The
system developed over time, with clerks taking over the
responsibilities for the record, and by the mid-1600s, the clerk of
assize was a full-time administrative official.13 By 1872, every paper
filed or used in a case became part of the record and was filed away in
the court archives.14 This system subsequently carried over into
Colonial America and was adapted differently in each state.15
The 1948 codification of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allowed appellate courts to “permit the original record to be sent as the
record on appeal.”16 In 1960, Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a
committee to draft the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; these
rules became effective in 1968, with the latest revision effective in
1998.17
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a) describes the record on
appeal as “(1) the original papers and exhibits filed in the district
court; (2) the transcript of the proceedings, if any; and (3) a certified
copy of the docket entries prepared by the district clerk.”18 When
reviewing the case, the appellate court is restricted to facts presented
11

Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
In Massachusetts, pleadings were oral until 1647, and at this point it was
determined that evidence should be presented in writing, to the great consternation of
lawyers. Id. at 163–64. In New York, jury trials were very informal and courts also
acted as the administrative arm of the government. Id. at 164–65. In Pennsylvania,
attorneys created a “code” for rules of proceeding through a trial—this provided that
all pleadings be short and in “ordinary and plain character, that they may be
understood and justice speedily administered.” Id. at 165–66. In the Southern
Colonies, many judges were not lawyers and did not have training in the law, and the
systems of recordkeeping and appeal were haphazard. Id. at 166–67.
16
Id. at 168.
17
Id.
18
FED. R. APP. P. 10(a).
12
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in the record, and it cannot consider facts which one party could have
presented to the district court but did not.19 If one or both of the parties
to the case believe that anything pertinent to the proceedings has been
omitted, or the record is otherwise incorrect, they can either stipulate
as to what should be done to correct the record or (if they cannot
agree) the party may file a motion with the trial court to supplement or
correct the record on appeal.20 Where the parties have not acted, it falls
on the court to supplement the appellate record in a civil case.21
Historically, an appellate court could not go outside the record on
appeal at all, either in review of the law or the facts.22 While the
English system only recently accepted the custom of reviewing
supplemental case law and relying on additional legal research outside
of the record, the American appellate courts have long since departed
from the harsh rule that they cannot consider additional legal
precedent in reviewing district court cases.23 However, an appellate
court cannot as easily consider additional facts not in the record,
because trial courts must “find” facts, and the task of the appellate
court then becomes to determine whether the trial court properly
applied the law to the facts it found.24 “For a judge to go outside of the
record in the search for additional facts, or for an advocate to
encourage a judge to do so, has long been a cardinal taboo of
American appellate practice.”25
While this taboo is still a part of the American legal system,
appellate courts have routinely considered additional facts and
independent investigation in certain scenarios.26 There are typically a
19

Hill v. Trustees of Indiana University, 537 F. 2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 1976).
See, supra note 10, at 174–75.
21
American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Esquire Labs of Arizona, Inc., 694
P. 2d 800, 808 (Ariz. App. 1984).
22
See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2016
(2012).
23
Frederick Schauer, The Decline of “The Record”: A Comment on Posner, 51
DUQ. L. REV. 51, 53 (2013).
24
Id. at 53–54.
25
Id. at 54.
26
Id.
20
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few different types of facts that appellate courts are able to consider
outside of the appellate record: (1) Canon Three27 and the use of
disinterested experts; (2) appointment of an Appellate Expert; (3)
appellate use of judicial notice of adjudicative facts; and (4) the court’s
determination of certain “legislative facts.”28
Taking the third scenario, Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence allows a court to take judicial notice of certain kinds of
facts.29 Rule 1101 of the Federal Rules of Evidence extends the
Federal Rules of Evidence to trial courts, bankruptcy courts, and
courts of appeals.30 This means that a court can consider certain facts
outside of the record, if these facts fall into certain categories: if the
fact is “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction”
or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”31 These are the sorts of
facts which a district court would not necessarily find during the trial
but can very easily ascertained. Common types of facts which courts
take judicial notice of include: “(1) scientific facts: for instance, does
the sun rise or set; (2) matters of geography: for instance, what are the
borders of a state; or (3) matters of political history: for instance, who
was president in 1958.”32
The Seventh Circuit took judicial notice of the time of sunset on a
particular day using WeatherSpark, a website which reports the
weather and other forecast information.33 There is a limit to the sorts
of facts of which a court may take judicial notice. For example, courts

27

“[J]udge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law
applicable to the proceeding . . . if the judge (1) gives the parties notice as to whom
the judge is consulting, (2) reveals the substance of the advice sought, and (3)
affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.” See, supra note 10, at 184.
28
Id. at 183–90; Schauer, supra note 23, at 56–57.
29
FED. R. EVID. 201.
30
FED. R. EVID. 1101(a).
31
FED. R. EVID. 201.
32
Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F. 3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997).
33
Owens v. Duncan, 781 F. 3d 360, 362 (7th Cir. 2015).
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can only take judicial notice of adjudicative facts34 which are not in
dispute and which are either common knowledge or are capable of
certain verification.35 The judge’s personal knowledge of the topic is
not enough because the fact to be put on judicial notice must be
accurate or its source must be an “uncontested matter of public
knowledge.”36
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are in place to control what
evidence can be introduced in United States courts.37 FRE 201
controls which facts may be taken on judicial notice, and only allows
adjudicative facts to be taken on judicial notice, not legislative facts. 38
Legislative facts are those facts which are not specific to the casespecific events in the litigation, but are relevant to the law-making
functions of appellate courts.39
In the seminal case Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall
concluded “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”40 Federal appellate courts may not
find facts because that is the province of the factfinder (trial judge or
jury).41 Courts have historically interpreted this as appellate courts do

34

“[A]djudicative facts are those to which the law is applied in the process of
adjudication. They are the facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case. They
relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses.” 2 KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 353 (1st ed. 1958).
35
Alvary v. United States, 302 F. 2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1962).
36
See, supra note 10, at 193.
37
FED. R. EVID. 101.
38
FED. R. EVID. 201(a).
39
Schauer, supra note 23, at 58; See, supra note 10, at 191 (“‘Legislative’ facts
concern matters which relate to what is known as the ‘legislative’ function of the
court, where the court is in essence ‘making law’ either by filling a gap in the
common law by formulating a rule, construing a statute, or framing a constitutional
rule.”).
40
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
41
E.g., United States v. Bd. of Com’rs of Grady Cnty, Okl., 54 F.2d 593 (10th
Cir. 1931).
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not have jurisdiction to make original findings of fact.42 However,
appellate courts are more and more regularly citing to information
found on the Internet in making their determinations. This article
explores the expansion of the appellate role as well as the application
of Internet research.
ROWE V. GIBSON
A. The Facts
In 2015, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a case
in which an Indiana prison inmate named Jeffrey Rowe brought an
appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.43 In 2009, Mr. Rowe, while an inmate
at Pendleton Correctional Facility in Indiana, was diagnosed with
gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD).44 This is a condition where a
valve-like structure in the esophagus cannot close properly, and the
contents of the stomach may back up into the esophagus.45 The
symptoms and complications produced by untreated GERD range
from “persistent, agonizing pain” to esophageal scarring, and the
increased risk of esophageal cancer.46
The prison physician who diagnosed Mr. Rowe prescribed him the
medication Zantac, with instructions to take a 150-milligram pill twice
a day.47 After this he was given the pills and permitted to keep them in
42

E.g., Cross v. Pasley, 267 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1959); Dixie Sand & Gravel
Corp. v. Holland, 255 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1958); Kistler v. Gingles, 171 F.2d 912 (8th
Cir. 1949).
43
Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F. 3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015).
44
Id. at 623.
45
Id. (citing Diseases and Conditions: Esophagitis, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/esophagitis/basics/definition/con20034313 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016)).
46
Id. (citing WebMD Answers: What Are the Complications of Long–Term
GERD?, WEBMD, http://answers.webmd.com/searchresults?ques=What%20Are%20the%20Complications%20of%20Long%20Term%20
GERD? (last visited Jan. 11, 2016)).
47
Id. at 624.
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his cell for more than a year.48 In January 2011, his pills were
confiscated, and he was then told that he would be allowed to take a
pill only when a prison nurse gave it to him, at 9:30 AM and 9:30
PM.49 He complained that he needed to take Zantac with his meals. In
response, the head of health care at the prison told Rowe that he could
keep in his cell any Zantac pills that he bought at the commissary, but
he was unable to keep Zantac given to him by prison staff.50
Unfortunately, Rowe was unable to afford the Zantac in the
commissary, so he relied on the Zantac prescribed to him by the
staff.51
In July 2011, his prescription lapsed, and although he made a
series of requests for the medication, the nurses denied all of them
because he had no prescription.52 He was told that his chronic
condition did not warrant the continued use of Zantac, and he would
have to purchase it from the commissary if he wished to continue
taking it.53 Rowe continued to request Zantac, and on July 13, 2011, a
physician who worked at the prison (who was not a gastroenterologist)
reviewed his medical records and noted that his condition did not
require Zantac at all.54 In August, he later relented and prescribed the
medication once more.55 Rowe could still only take it at 9:30 AM and
9:30 PM, “both times being distant from his meals.”56
In an affidavit, the physician stated that “it does not matter what
time of day Mr. Rowe receives his Zantac prescription. Each Zantac
pill is fully effective for twelve hour increments. Zantac does not have
to be taken before or with a meal to be effective.”57 Judge Posner
48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 625.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
49

9
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noted that according to the website of the manufacturer of over-thecounter Zantac, Zantac should be taken “30 to 60 minutes before
eating food or drinking beverages that cause heartburn.”58 Judge
Posner also noted instructions on the Mayo Clinic website that indicate
that Zantac should be taken with water thirty to sixty minutes before
eating a meal.59
Rowe claimed that he was in pain for five and a half hours after
eating, and that “he experienced pain for that length of time when he
was not allowed to take Zantac with or shortly before his meals.”60
B. District Court Opinion
Rowe subsequently brought a pro se § 1983 cause of action in the
Southern District of Indiana in April 2014.61 Defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint, which the
district court granted, finding that Rowe did not come forward with a
genuine issue of material fact for either his medical care claims or
retaliation claims.62 The defendants’ motion for summary judgment
was unopposed because Rowe did not respond to the motion; by not
responding, the district court noted that “plaintiff has conceded the
defendants’ version of the facts.”63

58

Id. (quoting Maximum Strength Zantac 150, ZANTAC,
https://www.zantacotc.com/zantac-maximum-strength.html (last visited Jan. 11,
2016)).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Rowe v. Vaisvilas, No. 1:11-cv-00975-SEB-DKL, 2014 WL 1631636 (N. D.
Ill. April 22, 2014) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by Rowe v. Gibson
798 F. 3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015).
62
Id. at *3.
63
Id. at *1.

10
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C. Appeal to Seventh Circuit
This case was appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and was heard by a
panel consisting of Judges Posner, Rovner, and Hamilton.64 At issue
for the court was whether the motion for summary judgment was
properly granted by the district court.65 Judge Posner, writing the
majority opinion, ruled that while the district court properly granted
summary judgment with respect to most of the claims, the district
court was incorrect in granting summary judgment with regard to the
restriction of the time frame to take Zantac, which caused appellant
extreme pain and discomfort.66
1. Judge Posner’s Majority Opinion
Judge Posner found a genuine issue of material fact in a rather
unusual manner: he consulted Internet sources such as the Mayo
Clinic, Healthline, and the Physicians’ Desk Reference.67 Judge Posner
noted his skepticism of Dr. Wolfe, the expert witness provided by the
defense. He noted that this physician had several suspicious qualities,
which he felt diminished the quality of his testimony, these included:
the fact that Dr. Wolfe was employed by Cortizon, but worked at the
prison; the fact that he was a specialist in preventative medicine;68 and
the fact that Dr. Wolfe is a frequent defendant in prisoner civil rights
cases.69 Judge Posner expressed his skepticism of this expert witness
and noted that his testimony was inadequate for these and many other
reasons.70
64

Rowe, 798 F. 3d at 623.
Id.
66
Id. at 631–32.
67
Id. at 626.
68
Judge Posner also found this information online at Dr. Wolfe’s profile on a
website called Healthgrades at www.healthgrades.com/physician/dr-william-wolfe2fgkl/background-check.
69
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 625.
70
Id.
65

11
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As Mr. Rowe was a pro se litigant, he did not have the resources
to effectively rebut Dr. Wolfe’s expert testimony.71 Because he could
not rebut such expert testimony, his case was dismissed under
summary judgment at the district court.72 Judge Posner, at the
appellate level, came to Mr. Rowe’s aid by doing his own independent
factual research.
First, Judge Posner considered the Zantac website, where he noted
that the instructions available to the public (also on the labels of the
boxes in which over-the-counter Zantac is sold) indicated that in order
to prevent symptoms the medicine should be taken “30 to 60 minutes
before eating food or drinking beverages that cause heartburn.”73
Judge Posner also consulted the Mayo Clinic website74 which noted
that for “adults and teenagers–150 mg with water taken thirty to sixty
minutes before eating a meal or drinking beverages you expect to
cause symptoms. Do not take more than 300 mg in twenty-four
hours.”75
He next examined the nature of stomach acid, “‘[t]he foods you
eat affect the amount of acid your stomach produces,’ and ‘many
people with GERD find that certain foods trigger their symptoms.’”76
He noted that this understanding of stomach acid will give us a full
picture of the symptoms that Rowe was experiencing in order to find a
genuine issue of material fact.77
From there, he moved on to the Physician’s Desk Reference,
which stated that
71

Id. at 629.
See id.
73
Id. at 625 (quoting Maximum Strength Zantac 150, ZANTAC
https://www.zantacotc.com/zantac-maximum-strength.html).
74
Histamine H2 Antagonist, MAYO CLINIC, www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/histamine-h2-antagonist-oralroute-injection-route-intravenousroute/proper-use/drg-20068584 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
75
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 626 (emphasis in original).
76
Id. (quoting Acid Reflux Diet and Nutrition Guide: Diet and Nutrition for
GERD, HEALTHLINE, http://www.healthline.com/health/gerd/dietnutrition#Overview1) (last visited Jan. 11, 2016)).
77
Id.
72

12
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[A] 150-mg dose of Zantac inhibits 79 percent of foodstimulated acid secretion for up to three hours after it’s taken.
This implies that the drug’s efficacy decreases over time and
so supports Rowe’s claim that a 150-mg dose does not
suppress his food stimulated acid secretions when taken six
and a half hours before a meal.78
Judge Posner stated that all of these references are evidence that
Rowe was in pain for five-and-a-half hours after eating his meals, and
that he experienced the pain for that length of time when he was not
allowed to take Zantac with his meals.79 Judge Posner noted that for
the purposes of summary judgment, “his attestations of extreme pain
must be credited.”80 Noting once again that he believed Dr. Wolfe was
not a credible witness because he is not a gastroenterologist, never
truly examined Rowe, and gave no basis for his “off-the-cuff medical
opinion,” Judge Posner commented that a court should not admit
opinion evidence “connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert.”81
Partly by citing to “highly reputable medical websites,”82 Judge
Posner ruled that summary judgment was improper because there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff was in pain,
and thus reversed the particular motion.83
In part responding to the dissenting Judge’s criticisms,84 Judge
Posner elaborated at length about the propriety of his Internet research
for these particular circumstances, including a lengthy appendix where
he addressed each of the dissent’s individual concerns about his

78

Id. at 627.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
82
Id. at 630–31.
83
Id.
84
See id. at 635–44 (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79
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ruling.85 In particular, Judge Posner discussed the peculiar
circumstances of this case: the plaintiff is a pro se litigant, who is
unable to afford his own expert and is unsuited to properly refute the
defendants’ own expert testimony, and the expert witness provided by
the defense is suspect for various reasons detailed above.86
Interestingly, Judge Posner defended his use of Internet research
by using a “legal realist” approach.87 Judge Posner’s understanding of
legal realism is defined as a school of thought about judicial decisionmaking where the judge renders his opinion by considering the
“plasticity of the American judicial system” in making decisions and
“wants to do what he can to improve the system.”88 This philosophy is
often contrasted with legal formalism, which Judge Posner describes
as a judge’s adherence to set rules and principles in deciding cases, in
place so the judge does not have to (and in fact resists the temptation
to) rely upon her own ideologies and personal conceptions of the law
in deciding cases.89
In deciding Rowe, Judge Posner looked closely at the plaintiff’s
situation as well as the reasoning why an appellate judge should look
outside of the record in making his determinations.90 Judge Posner
commented that “[i]t is heartless to make a fetish of adversary
procedure if by doing so feeble evidence is credited because the
opponent has no practical access to offsetting evidence.”91 He noted
that it would be unfair to the plaintiff to lose this case on summary
judgment just because he lacks the wherewithal to contest the
defense’s expert witness’ testimony, however “implausible” it may
be.92
85

Id. at 632–35 (majority opinion).
Id.
87
See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Opinions and Appellate Advocacy in
Federal Courts—One Judge’s Views, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 3 (2013).
88
Id. at 9.
89
Id. at 7.
90
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 631–32.
91
Id. at 630.
92
Id.
86
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While Judge Posner noted that the vast majority of the decision
was based upon Rowe’s own declarations and the timeline of his
inability to obtain Zantac, he supplemented the record with “cautious,
limited Internet research that [the Court has] conducted in default of
the parties’ having done so.”93 Judge Posner seemed to be taking a
stand with this decision vis-à-vis “parity between the adversaries.”94
Because the plaintiff was a pro se litigant with very few resources
available to him (one of the main reasons why Rowe suffered for so
long was because he was unable to afford Zantac from the prison
commissary) and the fact that his claim was not frivolous (he was in
serious pain for quite some time, necessitating this § 1983 action),
Judge Posner suggested that the district court judge should recruit a
lawyer to represent Rowe as well as appoint a “neutral expert witness,
authorized by Fed. R. Evid. 706” to address the issues in this case.95
Judge Posner’s use of Internet research seemed to act as a stop-gap,
keeping the case alive for future litigation.96 His decision seemed to be
based partly on the “unfairness” in the system, a critical notion for
many legal realists.97
Judge Posner ended with a critique of the health care system in
American prisons, and noted that this case is a perfect illustration of
these problems, thereby emphasizing his notion of the importance of
the claim being brought.98

93

Id. at 630.
Id. at 631–32.
95
Id.
96
See id.
97
See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the
Issue? (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 320,
2010).
98
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 632.
94
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2. Judge Rovner’s Concurrence
Judge Rovner added a concurrence to this decision.99 She noted
that is a relatively simple case that has been hijacked “into a debate
over the propriety of appellate courts supplementing the record with
Internet research.”100 She clearly believed that this case didn’t need to
depart from the record at all because Rowe has consistently
complained of “hours of severe pain” when not taking his medication
with his meals, and because of the stage of the proceedings, the court
must give Rowe the “benefit of all conflicts and draw all reasonable
inferences in his favor as the nonmoving party.”101 She noted that Dr.
Wolfe’s status as a defendant is an example of his self-interest and
Rowe’s claims of persistent pain was sufficient to discredit his
testimony at the summary judgment stage.102 Judge Rovner noted that
the information found on Zantac’s website and other “reputable
medical web sites” only bolsters the plausibility of the existence of a
factual dispute, and this extra-record information is not necessary to
the outcome at all.103 Judge Rovner stood as a reasonable middle
ground between Judge Posner’s legal realism approach and Judge
Hamilton’s formalistic dissent, keeping out of this conflict
altogether.104
3. Judge Hamilton’s Dissent
Judge Hamilton concurred in part and vigorously dissented in
part.105 He concurred with the court’s disposition affirming summary
judgment for defendants on most of the claims.106 Judge Hamilton
99

Id. at 635 (Rovner, J., concurring).
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
See id.
105
Id. at 635 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
106
Id.
100
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vigorously dissented to the reversal of summary judgment on Rowe’s
last claim regarding the timing of the administration of Zantac
between January and July of 2011 and after August 2011.107 Like
Judge Posner’s legal realism arguments in the majority, Judge
Hamilton tracked closely with a more formalistic approach to the role
of an appellate court.108
His criticisms focused on the Internet research which the majority
used “to contradict the only expert evidence actually in the summary
judgment record” and to find a genuine issue of material fact sufficient
to reverse summary judgment.109 Judge Hamilton’s grievance was that
the majority’s inclusion of this extra-record evidence ran “contrary to
long-established law and raises a host of practical problems the
majority fails to address.”110
First, Judge Hamilton analyzed the facts in the record to show that
the majority based its decision primarily on its Internet research.111
Judge Hamilton noted that the evidence in the record showed that the
plaintiff believed that the prison schedule only allowing him to take
the Zantac medication at particular times caused him unnecessary pain
and that the prison physician, Dr. Wolfe, testified that in his
professional opinion it did not matter what time of day the plaintiff
took the medication.112 In Judge Hamilton’s opinion, the prison staff
treated the prisoner’s disease appropriately, and the evidence did not
support a reasonable inference of deliberate indifference.113 Judge
Hamilton disagreed with the majority’s approach to this question
because (despite its protests) the majority based its decision primarily
on its independent Internet research.114 Without the Internet research,
the plaintiff did not make enough of a case to avoid summary
107

Id. at 636.
See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 96.
109
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 636 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
108
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judgment because the evidence in the case did not point to deliberate
indifference on the part of the medical personnel at the prison.115
Judge Hamilton noted that as the average age of the prison increases,
so too will the number of cases like this, with prisoners complaining of
chronic pain.116 “The fact that a treatment for pain is not as effective as
the prisoner would like should not be enough to support an inference
that the prison staff are deliberately indifferent to his pain.”117 Only by
relying upon independent factual research did the majority make its
case that the course of treatment was “so clearly inadequate as to
amount to deliberate indifference.”118
Next, Judge Hamilton discussed the federal law concerning the
court’s factual research outside the record.119 He noted that the ease of
Internet research has created a new temptation for judges to engage in
factual extra-record fact-finding.120 He distinguished between using
“careful research to provide context and background information to
make court decisions understandable” and using independent factual
research to find a genuine issue of material fact, as is the case here.121
According to him, an appellate court must simply not use independent
factual research to make its decision.122
Judge Hamilton provided a string of precedents which are
contrary to the majority opinion’s use of independent factual
research.123 He also stressed that this extra-record fact-finding runs
contrary to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and the law of judicial
notice.124 The majority of facts considered by courts when deciding
cases are the product of the adversarial procedure between opposing
115

Id.
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 638.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 639.
116
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parties.125 Judge Hamilton noted that “[t]he foundation of our legal
system is a confidence that the adversarial procedures will test shaky
or questionable evidence.”126 When a court bases its decisions on its
own factual research that confidence in the system is lessened.127
Judge Hamilton also criticized the majority’s interpretation of the
exception of judicial notice.128 “Judicial notice ‘substitutes the
acceptance of a universal truth for the conventional method of
introducing evidence,’ and as a result, courts must use caution and
‘strictly adhere’ to the rule before taking judicial notice of pertinent
facts.”129 According to Judge Hamilton, proper timing of Zantac
medication for maximum efficiency is not “generally known within
the trial court’s jurisdiction” and it cannot be readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, under Rule
201(b).130
The majority has therefore impermissibly created a new category,
between judicial notice and evidence presented by the adversarial
process.131 This sort of evidence is impermissible under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and the majority cited no authority to support its
creation of this new category.132 Hamilton was also not swayed by the
majority’s noting that law clerks and judges routinely engage in
research outside of the record for deciding cases—this research has
always been understood to be legal in nature, and independent factual
research crosses a line.133
Judge Hamilton’s third point was where his dissent developed a
real bite. Next, he considered the practical problems with the
125

Id.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d
1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1997)).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 640.
133
Id.
126
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majority’s approach.134 Judge Hamilton did concede that the majority
was correct in its assessment of the judicial system with regard to pro
se litigants and most especially with those pro se litigants who are
prisoners bringing claims of deliberate indifference.135 He agreed that
this is where the judicial system is least reliable because few prisoners
have access to attorneys and medical experts to address these issues.136
However, he disagreed with the measures that Judge Posner took in
the majority opinion because of the profound consequences that such
measures would have on the entire judicial system.137
Plainly speaking, a judge (according to Hamilton) must not
advocate for one side, and the majority opinion crossed this line.138
Also, the majority offered this new take on the judge’s role, but it
offered no guidance on how to implement it and what standards should
apply—“[u]nder the majority’s approach, the factual record will never
be truly closed.”139 This will inevitably create an incredibly expansive
record and undue litigation regarding what information “should have
been considered.”140 This leads to the question of how much
independent factual research must judges do and when is it enough? 141
Judge Hamilton also contended that the majority’s solution to
have district courts appoint attorneys and expert witnesses for pro se
litigants is untenable, and it is similarly not fair to pass the costs of
these attorneys and experts to the defendants.142 There are also
practical problems when the case goes to trial—how does a judge
present this new factual information to a jury?143 The parties will also
need to anticipate what evidence the judge will introduce on top of
134

Id.
Id. at 640–41.
136
Id. at 641.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 642.
135
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anticipating what each side will argue, which creates an additional
burden on both sides in the litigation.144
Judge Hamilton was concerned about the judge’s role with
Internet research, especially that “[t]he internet is an extraordinary
resource, but it cannot turn judges into competent substitutes for
experts or scholars such as historians, engineers, chemists,
psychologists, or physicians.”145 By introducing Internet research, the
majority was causing far-reaching problems in the judicial system as a
whole.146
Lastly, Judge Hamilton considered the question of the reliability
of the Internet research in question.147 He noted that the websites
relied upon by the majority contain many “important disclaimers that
emphasize the need for filtering their information through qualified
medical advice, which no member of this court is qualified to
provide.”148 Also, the content of the websites did not clearly support
the majority’s views that Dr. Wolfe’s testimony about the timing of
Zantac was so wrong that a jury could infer that prison staff were
deliberately indifferent to Rowe’s health needs.149 The websites also
indicated that those patients with a chronic condition should consult a
physician regarding appropriate dosage.150 Some of the sources did not
indicate at all about the necessity of taking the pills with meals.151
Judge Hamilton concluded that the majority’s use of the Internet
research “is not a reliable substitute for proper evidence subjected to
adversarial scrutiny.”152 He found no basis for the majority’s harsh
criticism of Dr. Wolfe, especially because he has been given no

144

Id.
Id. at 643.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 644.
152
Id.
145
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opportunity to respond or explain his views.153 “In the end, whether
Dr. Wolfe’s testimony about the timing of Rowe’s doses was right or
wrong in some pure and objective sense, or in a case tried with ample
resources and talent on both sides, is not a question for us.”154 Dr.
Wolfe’s testimony was undisputed, and therefore this court should not
reverse based on its own untested factual research.155 This went well
beyond the scope of the role of the appellate court.156
CRAFTING A TEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF INTERNET FACTS IN PRO SE
CASES
A. Appellate Courts’ current considerations of information outside of
the record.
Appellate Courts already consider facts outside of the Record in
certain circumstances. Appellate courts consider “social” or
“legislative” facts often in considering specific cases, most commonly
constitutional cases.157 The Supreme Court is particularly guilty of
such practices and has a long history of considering outside
“legislative” facts in coming to its conclusions.158 Courts and
commentators consider “legislative” facts to be outside the purview of
Rule 201, and, therefore, they consider a wider variety of “legislative
facts” in reaching determinations.159

153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1 (2011).
158
Id. at 27.
159
FED. R. EVID. 201(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); Caitlin E. Borgmann,
Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 CAL. L. REV.
1185, 1191 (2013).
154
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The Supreme Court has ruled on many cases where the Court
considered outside legislative facts in reaching its determinations.160
The notion of judicial notice itself allows any court to use casespecific facts without proof from the parties.161 Appellate courts do
frequently take judicial notice of both legislative and adjudicative
facts, often on their own initiative.162 As a general rule, appellate
courts are hesitant to take notice of facts which were available to the
moving party but were not raised at the trial level.163 Judge Posner
himself called this practice “sandbagging” and criticized sophisticated
parties for gaming the system in such a way.164 It is worth noting here
that Judge Posner’s criticisms are focused upon a litigant knowingly
withholding evidence and then asking the appellate court to take
judicial notice of it.165 Judge Posner does not address the situation of
an unsophisticated litigant failing to address certain facts in his brief to
the district court. The unsophisticated litigant most likely lacks the
requisite intent to game the system in such a manner.
Appellate Courts can also consider facts raised for the first time in
amicus curiae briefs. An amicus curiae brief is filed by an amicus,166 a
non-party to the case, who offers information that bears on the case,
but has not been solicited by any of the parties. It is proper for amici to
provide non-record facts that broadly and generally address the issues

160

See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008), Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954).
161
29 AM. JUR. 2D, EVIDENCE § 24 (2013).
162
See, e.g., Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 100 of New York, N.Y.
& Vicinity, AFL-CIO v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d
534, 540 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Indian Palms Assoc. Ltd., 61 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir.
1995).
163
Zell v. Jacoby-Bender Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 38 (7th Cir. 1976).
164
Tamari v. Bache & Co., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1988).
165
“A litigant cannot put in part of his case in the trial court and then, if he
loses, put in the rest on appeal.” Id.
166
“friend of the court”
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in the case.167 These cases often involve greater constitutional
implications, and thus they draw the eye of public policy groups and
governmental organizations with specialized knowledge of the
background of the case.168 Many watershed Supreme Court decisions
ruling on constitutional protections have used new facts in amicus
briefs as justification for their decisions. Brown v. Board of Education
is one example of the Court relying on sociological research presented
to the Court by way of an amicus brief.169
Appellate courts consider facts outside the record in other areas as
well. The Seventh Circuit has previously allowed plaintiffs appealing
the dismissal of their complaints to provide the appellate court with
non-record evidence, explaining how the plaintiffs might prove the
dismissed claim if allowed to go forward.170
How is allowing certain Internet research different from the
notions of judicial notice or the inclusion of amicus briefs? If
developed with standards requiring the judge to give notice to the
parties and allow them opportunity to respond, independent limited
research by an appellate judge should be no different than an appellate
court’s limited use of judicial notice or arguments advanced in amicus
briefs.

167

Sylvia H. Walbot & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe of
Florida Courts?, 32 STETSON L. REV. 269, 291 (2003).
168
Paul M. Collins, Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC. REV. 807
(2004).
169
In Brown, the Court relied upon sociological research presented by the
ACLU which detailed studies that concluded that segregation upon the basis of race
has a detrimental effect upon schoolchildren. 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954); Brief on
Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Supporting Appellants,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 482 (1954) 1952 WL 82040.
170
See Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); Dawson v.
General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1992); Orthmann v. Apple River
Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1985).
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B. More Liberal Construction of Pleadings for Pro Se Litigants
A common trend in Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence is
the special effort courts put forth to liberally interpret pro se briefs to
avoid dismissing or denying relief to pro se litigants. The Supreme
Court decisions in Conley v. Gibson and Haines v. Kerner are seminal
in the development of the rule for liberal construction of pro se
complaints.171 Both cases advance the notion that pro se pleadings are
held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”172
Different jurisdictions apply this concept in different ways
concerning appellate briefs. Some jurisdictions take the approach that
pro se litigants should be treated exactly the same as parties who are
represented by lawyers in filing their appellate briefs.173 Others are
more lax about appellate pro se pleading requirements and find that
liberal construction of pro se appellate briefs is appropriate.174 Several
jurisdictions, including the Seventh Circuit, have conflicting binding
precedent on when a court may liberally construe pro se appellate
briefs.175 Only one jurisdiction applies a factored-approach rather than
uniform per se rules of liberal construction.176 The Third Circuit
considers “pro se liberality as a discretionary tool available to
judges.”177 A litigant’s pro se status is a single factor in how liberally
the court shall interpret their pleadings.178

171

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972).
172

Haines, 404 U.S. at 520.
These jurisdictions are the First, Fourth, Eighth and D.C. Circuits. Correll,
supra note 2, at 876–79.
174
These jurisdictions are the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. Id.
at 879–83.
175
These jurisdictions are the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 884–85.
176
This jurisdiction is the Third Circuit. Id. at 883–84.
177
Id. at 884.
178
Id.
173
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The issue of waiver becomes important in cases where an
appellate court construes pro se briefs liberally.179 The general rule is
that an appellate court will not consider an argument raised for the first
time on appeal, and will consider that argument “waived” because it is
not in the pleadings from the trial court. Appellate discretion in liberal
construction of appellate briefs implicates the notion of waiver
because a court can interpret vague pleadings from pro se litigants in a
way that avoids waiver of issues.180
The Supreme Court’s ultimate goal in advancing the argument of
liberal interpretation of pro se briefs was to create a way for pro se
litigants to have better access to the courts.181 The Supreme Court is
primarily interested in preventing pro se litigants from becoming a
separate, underrepresented class in court.182 A court weighing the
notion of equal protection against a “helping hand” for pro se litigants
often tips the scale in favor of the helping hand.183
Pro se litigants are not merely the beleaguered and downtrodden.
Many attorneys also represent themselves pro se and other pro se

179

Id. at 864–65.
Id. at 880 (quoting Audler v. CBC Innovis, Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 255 (5th Cir.
2008) (“[P]ro se litigants’ briefs are liberally construed so as to avoid waiver of
issues[;] the indulgence for parties represented by counsel is necessarily narrower.”).
181
Id. at 889. Correll notes that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between a
rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and
one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance.” Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)).
182
Id. at 890. “[O]nce established, [appellate] avenues must be kept free of
unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.”
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
183
Correll, supra note 2, at 891–92; see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507
(2011). In Turner, the Supreme Court reversed a civil contempt order for a pro se
litigant because the trial court’s failure to provide procedural safeguards constituted
a violation of the litigant’s due process rights. The fact that the litigant was pro se
informed the Court’s view of due process. Turner’s obligations might lead courts to
assure “fundamental fairness” through procedural safeguards, making the courts
more open and accessible. Id. at 2519–20.
180
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litigants are similarly educated and wealthy.184 Correll considered this
idea when developing a solution regarding pro se briefings and adopts
the Third Circuit’s approach of using a factor-based system to
determine liberality of appellate pleadings.185 Pro se status acts as a
trigger, and a court should also consider “material in the record
regarding a pro se litigant’s education, reasons for proceeding without
counsel, and success in presenting his arguments up to that point.”186
These factors would allow courts to ensure that pro se litigants are
able to advance their arguments without concern for potential waiver
due to lack of knowledge. Correll also indicates that this approach
could also solve the problem of “poor briefing by counsel” and similar
issues raised by indigent litigants trusting their matters to incompetent
counsel.187
The Supreme Court has already advanced this argument that pro
se litigants should be offered the benefit of the doubt in the form of
liberal construction of pleadings. Some jurisdictions allow pro se
litigants a chance to be heard on the merits without worrying about
accidental waiver of their arguments. Similarly, the use of judicial
notice and Internet research should be used by appellate courts in
similar situations. If a pro se appellant has improperly developed the
record on the trial level and the court feels that it can take judicial
notice of such information, then it is proper for an appellate court to do
so. This should be limited to the situations where pro se pleadings are
to be interpreted liberally.
C. Judicial Notice and the Internet
Another area of growing concern for both trial and appellate
courts is the increasing use of Internet research in the courtroom.
Courts are beginning to take judicial notice of facts found on the
Internet with increasing regularity. Many cases at both the trial and
184

Correll, supra note 2, at 870–72.
Id. at 897.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 897–98.
185
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appellate levels have involved independent judicial research by the
court.188
Jeffrey Bellin and Andrew Guthrie Ferguson note this growing
trend in their article, and specifically note that the ease of Internet
research can create an incentive for judges and jurors to search for
information on the Internet rather than simply rely upon the
information provided by the parties.189 By allowing a court to take
judicial notice of information found online, we can limit the urge for
the fact-finders to impermissibly search the Internet for their answers
to how to interpret a case.190 An appellate court could take judicial
notice of such Internet facts in the same manner as it takes judicial
notice of other adjudicative facts.
Bellin and Ferguson crafted a test on the admissibility standards
for information discovered using the Internet. This test adopts Rule
201 so a court may properly determine the reliability of Internet
sources in taking judicial notice of such information.191 Their test
takes into account three attributes of the online source: “(1) knowledge
of the subject matter, (2) independence from relevant bias, and (3)
incentive to ensure accuracy.”192 By meeting these three criteria,
information found online can be deemed to be sufficiently accurate to
meet the parameters of information to be judicially noticed under Rule
201.193
188

See, e.g., Laborer’s Pension Fund v. Blackmore Sewer Constr., Inc., 298
F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1266 n.9
(11th Cir. 2000); Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1235 n.12 (11th
Cir. 1999).
189
Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial
Notice in the Information Age, 108 NW. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2014).
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1167.
192
Id.
193
For example, websites maintained by government agencies contain
seemingly accurate information due to the expertise of the agencies with regard to
the subject matter, lack of bias due to governmental standards, and incentives to
ensure the accuracy of the posted information. See id. at 1168–70. The authors also
note that even if a source could be biased, such as crime statistics from New York
City Police Department (who has an incentive to skew these statistics to show less
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If an appellate court is able to take judicial notice of certain
adjudicative facts sua sponte, then the court should also be able to take
judicial notice of information found on the Internet in the same
manner. A concern that appellate courts have about taking judicial
notice relates to the “sandbagging” notion; appellate courts are
reluctant to take notice of facts that a party could have raised in the
trial court.194 This is not an issue in cases where pro se litigants are
appealing their cases with insufficiently pled facts. In these cases, this
is not a tactic, but rather it is an example of the litigant’s lack of
knowledge about the proper facts to allege. Like an appellate court
liberally interpreting the pro se litigant’s pleadings to avoid waiver of
issues on appeal, an appellate court could also conduct a limited
investigation into Internet research under this expanded notion of
judicial notice.
D. Judicial Notice of Internet Facts in Pro Se Appeals: A Test
The Supreme Court has emphasized that appellate pleadings
submitted by pro se litigants should be interpreted leniently to avoid
waiver of arguments because pro se litigants are in danger of having
their cases dismissed due to procedural flaws.195 The same sort of
procedure should apply to appellate discretion in taking judicial notice
of information found on the Internet so that pro se appellants do not
waive arguments based on facts which were insufficiently pled.
By combining the Correll standard for judicial leniency for pro se
appellants and the Bellin and Fergson standard for appellate judicial
notice of Internet facts, we can give further effect to the Supreme
Court’s reasoning for assisting pro se litigants. Ideally, the litigants
should be able to advance their own arguments using assistance from

crime), if the bias cuts against the fact to be established (e.g. if a public defender
uses this information to show the prevalence of crime in the area) then the bias does
not undermine the evidentiary value of the information. Id. at 1170.
194
See Tamari v. Bache & Co., 838 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1988).
195
Correll, supra note 2, at 895–96.
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legal aid providers, court-appointed counsel, and online education.196
These measures are often expensive or impractical as far as resources
currently available to pro se litigants. The appellate court’s use of
limited Internet research can serve as a measure to ensure that these
pro se litigants do not lose their arguments due to a procedural pitfall.
First, we must establish whether the party is pro se or similarly
situated. By looking to factors that Correll considered, we can
determine whether judicial leniency is even necessary. The Third
Circuit treats pro se status as one “flag” in deciding whether to
exercise discretionary waiver rules.197 Other important factors which
can be considered are the litigant’s education, reasons for proceeding
without counsel, and success in presenting his arguments up to that
point.198 This approach could therefore also work for indigent clients
who are represented by incompetent counsel.199
Next, we should determine whether judicial notice of Internet
facts would be useful to assist courts in liberally interpreting a pro se
litigant’s pleadings. In a situation where a pro se litigant attempts to
state a claim but has inartfully pled his case, or has only included
conclusory statements rather than specific material facts, an appellate
court should take judicial notice of facts in certain Internet sources.
The purpose of lowered pleading standards for pro se litigants is to
allow a court the opportunity to hear their cases on the merits, rather
than allow the claims to be dismissed because they are inartfully
pled.200 While a ruling on summary judgment is a decision on the
merits of the case, a pro se litigant could unintentionally doom his own
case by failing to allege facts correctly or relying on conclusory
196

Shon R. Hopwood, Slicing Through the Great Legal Gordian Knot: Ways
to Assist Pro Se Litigants in Their Quest for Justice, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1229,
1235–38 (2011).
197
Correll, supra note 2, at 897; see United States v. Contents of Two
Shipping Containers Seized at Elizabeth, 113 F. App’x 460, 462 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“Pro se status by no means creates an automatic exception to the waiver rule, but we
have relied on this factor to relax the waiver rule in the past.”).
198
Correll, supra note 2, at 897.
199
Id. at 897–98.
200
Id. at 885–93.
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statements, especially in cases that require specialized knowledge. In
addition to reading the pleadings liberally, if a litigant fails to rebut
expert testimony effectively, a court should consider careful Internet
research as a way to counter an opposing expert’s testimony and give
effect to the Supreme Court’s concern that pro se litigants be able to
fully try their cases. At the early stage in the proceedings, this Internet
research could also give a pro se litigant the benefit of the doubt, and
provide him with more resources should his case go to trial.
Next, the court should consider the nature of the Internet source
and whether the evidence can be judicially noticed. The Bellin and
Ferguson standard for judicial notice of Internet information should be
used.201 The information should be of a type where an online source
consulted is knowledgeable about the subject matter, is independent
from relevant bias, and has incentive to be accurate.202 There is much
information on the Internet which could be helpful to a pro se litigant’s
case. Especially if the information is more technical, or requires an
expert, a free source likely exists on the Internet. These standards will
help narrow what sources are appropriate to consult for these facts and
which ones are not.
Lastly, the court should consider specific examples of sources
which might be accurate and reputable enough to satisfy the judicial
notice requirement. For statistical information, many government
websites such as websites maintained by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration or Bureau of Justice Statistics fit these
standards.203 For medical information, WebMD is a source that is
maintained and edited by experts, making it an easily accessible and
accurate source under FRE 201.204 Google Maps provides an
extremely accurate mapping system, with Google having a great
financial incentive to ensure the accuracy of the site.205 An Internet
researcher can find information about the chain of title of a home or its
201

Bellin and Ferguson, supra note 189, at 1167.
Id.
203
See id. at 1168.
204
See id.
205
See id. at 1170.
202
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current PIN number by searching County websites.206 The IRS website
provides free information and resources about filing taxes.207 There are
numerous other resources which pass the test and which courts could
potentially use to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
DID JUDGE POSNER GET IT RIGHT?
To determine whether Judge Posner appropriately took judicial
notice of this Internet information, a reviewer must evaluate his
process and which websites he consulted. First, Rowe is a pro se
prisoner, who expressly attempted to get access to both counsel and a
medical expert, but his petitions were denied.208 It is appropriate for a
court to exercise judicial discretion in interpreting pleadings and
taking judicial notice of Internet facts.
Next, the judge should consider whether taking judicial notice of
Internet facts is beneficial to the pro se litigant’s case. In Rowe, the
appellant was appealing from a motion granting summary judgment.209
The district court granted summary judgment in part because Rowe
did not respond to the motion, thereby conceding defendants’ versions
of the facts.210 The district court also denied Rowe’s motion to appoint
an expert to explain his medical condition more fully.211 These were
procedural and economic pitfalls, which are the types of inequities the
Supreme Court is hoping to balance by allowing pro se pleadings to be
interpreted liberally.212 Using the framework advanced in this article,
Judge Posner properly consulted the Internet for this specific appeal.
206

See, e.g., Cook County Property Search, COOK CTY. PROP. TAX PORTAL,
http://www.cookcountypropertyinfo.com/Pages/PIN-Search.aspx (last visited Jan.
11, 2016).
207
IRS, https://www.irs.gov/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
208
Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 629–30 (7th Cir. 2015).
209
Id. at 623.
210
Rowe v. Vaisvilas, No. 1:11-cv-00975-SEB-DKL, 2014 WL 1631636, at *1
(N. D. Ill. April 22, 2014).
211
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 635 (Rovner, J., concurring).
212
See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972).
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Lastly, the court should consider the types of Internet sources
which were consulted, to determine whether judicial notice is proper.
Judge Posner considered a variety of websites in making his
determination. National Institutes of Health,213 Mayo Clinic,214 and
WebMD215 are all medical websites providing expert advice to the
masses. These websites are edited by experts in the medical field, and,
therefore, they are reliable, unbiased, and have an incentive to be
accurate.216 Therefore, Judge Posner could take judicial notice of
information regarding GERD generally, as well as the effects and
proper dosing procedures of certain medications. Judge Posner’s
citation to the Zantac website217 is more suspect. The Zantac website is
maintained by the company which is surely knowledgeable about the
product it sells, but the company could have incentive for biased
information to sell more of its product. Judge Posner noted that this is
not suspect because “the manufacturer would be taking grave risks if it
misrepresented the properties of its product.”218 Still, a corporate
213

Gastroesophageal reflux disease, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000265.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
214
Diseases and Conditions, Esophagitis, MAYO CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/esophagitis/basics/definition/con20034313; Drugs and Supplements: Histamine H2 Antagonist (Oral Route, Injection
Route, Intravenous Route), MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugssupplements/histamine-h2-antagonist-oral-route-injection-route-intravenousroute/proper-use/drg-20068584 (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
215
Complications of Heartburn and GERD, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/heartburn-gerd/guide/untreated-heartburn (last visited Jan.
11, 2016).
216
See, e.g., Bellin & Ferguson, supra note 189, at 1178 n. 231 (quoting Art
Chimes, Website of the Week—WebMD, VOICE OF AM.,
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2008-12-voa20/405489.html/ (Nov. 1, 2009,
3:37 P.M.) [stating that “everything is reviewed by experts” and quoting the
WebMD Chief Medical Editor that “every piece of content on our site actually goes
through a doctor’s eyes. A board-certified physician will look at the content, make
sure it’s up to date, accurate, and doesn’t have anything misleading that might be
misconstrued by a lay audience.”]).
217
Maximum Strength Zantac 150, ZANTAC,
https://www.zantacotc.com/zantac-maximum-strength.html# drug-facts.
218
Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2015).
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website stemming from a business model of selling as much Zantac as
possible would include more suspect information than websites
maintained by physicians which discuss the properties of the same
medication. This information is corroborated, but the Zantac website
should hold less weight than similar sources from either WebMD or
The Mayo Clinic. Lastly, Judge Posner cited to Wikipedia219 and
Healthgrades220 for general information about Zantac as well as a
background check on the defense’s expert witness.221 These websites
are not maintained and edited by experts and, therefore, their
information is suspect.222 Judge Posner’s use of the information on
these websites is therefore improper and should have been excluded.
Moreover, Judge Posner used the Healthgrades information to question
the witness’ credibility.223 This is not an appropriate application of
judicial notice, and, therefore, it should not be verified using Internet
research. In the future, if Judge Posner takes judicial notice of
information found on the Internet, he should restrict his searches to
reliable sources evaluated by this test.
CONCLUSION
The notion that pro se litigants overwhelmingly need a court’s
assistance is misleading and overbroad. Many pro se litigants are
219

Ranitidine, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranitidine (last visited
Jan. 11, 2016).
220
HEALTHGRADES, http://www.healthgrades.com/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
221
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 624–25.
222
Terms of Use, WIKIPEDIA,
https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/terms_of_use (last visited Jan. 11, 2016)
(“Because the Wikimedia Projects are collaboratively edited, all of the content that
we host is provided by users like yourself, and we do not take an editorial role. This
means that we generally do not monitor or edit the content of the Project websites,
and we do not take any responsibility for this content.”); Ira S. Nash, Web alert:
Healthgrades, 5 CURRENT CARDIOLOGY REPORTS 92–93 (2003) (“The algorithms
used to create the scores are proprietary; therefore, it is not possible to ‘score the
scorecard.’ Many quality experts have expressed concern about the reliability and
validity of such “black box” rating scales”).
223
Rowe, 798 F.3d at 624–25.
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educated, competent, and make the choice not to use representation.224
Many represented indigent parties seek out counsel who turn out to be
incompetent.225 Applying a standard across the board is the way to
ensure that a court will always reach the just result. Also, an appellate
court can maximize the probability that litigants’ claims are not
dismissed due to procedural flaws by applying judicial notice to liberal
pleading standards. The system must contain some representation of
fairness. “Equality before the law, like universal suffrage, holds a
privileged place in our political system, and to deny equality before
the law delegitimizes that system . . . when these rights are denied, the
expectation that the affronted parties should continue to respect the
political system . . . has no basis.”226

224

See Correll, supra note 2, at 867–75.
See id. at 897–98.
226
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 264–66 (1988).
225
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